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Message Text

SECRET

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47
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 RSC-01 DRC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 ISO-00

EURE-00 NEA-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAJ-01

ACDA-19 IO-14 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-04 /139 W
---------- 079190
O 191401Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3775
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 OTTAWA 1929

SECTO 117

DEPT ALSO PASS ROUTINE INFO ALL NATO CAPS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP: (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: NATO MIN OTTAWA: REGULAR SESSION, AFTERNOON JUNE 18--
MIDDLE EAST

1. FOLLOWING PRIVATE SESSION, AFTERNOON SESSION DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH MIDDLE EAST AND WAS LED OFF BY SECRETARY, ON THE UNDER-STANDING THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD CONFINE COMMENTS TO PRESS TO SAYING SECRETARY GAVE GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

2.SECRETARY STATED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO COMPARE THE SITUATION NOW WITH THAT OF LAST OCTOBER. THEN A UNITED ARAB BLOC BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION WAS PRESSING WESTERN COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE US ACROSS A WIDE RANGE
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OF ISSUES, USING OIL AS A WEAPON. THIS LED TO BITTER

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DEBATE AND PROFOUND CONCERN IN ALLIANCE COUNTRIES. EARLY
IN NOVEMBER THE US ADOPTED A NEW APPROACH BASED ON THE
PROPOSITION THAT ONLY THE US WOULD STATE OBJECTIVES
THAT COULD IN FACT BE REALIZED. THEREFORE, THE US
AVOIDED AND HAD CONTINUED TO AVOID A DEFINITION OF
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. SECRETARY SAID, WITH RESPECT
TO THE SOVIETS, THAT US COULD ALWAYS PRODUCE AT LEAST
A MILITARY STALEMATE AND THAT SOVIET POWER HAD NEVER
BEEN USED IN MIDDLE EAST. HE CONTINUED THAT US
HAD NOT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO AGREE WITH ALL ARAB
PROPOSITIONS OR POSITIONS AND HAD CHOSEN TO PROCEED
STEP BY STEP, AIMING AT ATTAINABLE OBJECTIVES.

3. THERE HAD BEEN A STARTLING CHANGE IN EGYPTIAN
ORIENTATION AND THE CHANGE IN ORIENTATION ON THE
PART OF SYRIA HAD BEEN ALMOST AS REMARKABLE. FIRST, THE
SYRIANS HAD REGARDED THEMSELVES AS THE VANGUARD OF THE
ARAB CAUSE. NOW THEY HAD AGREED TO A DISENGAGEMENT
LINE ON WHAT THEY REGARDED AS THEIR OWN TERRITORY,
AS WELL AS TO A LIMITATION OF THEIR FORCES AND A UN
PRESENCE. EGYPT TODAY WAS PREPARED TO FOLLOW A
STEP BY STEP APPROACH AND SO WAS SYRIA, THOUGH
SLIGHTLY LESS PREDICTABLY.

4. PROGRESS, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, WAS NOT
FREE FROM PROBLEMS AND HE IDENTIFIED THREE AS
PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT: BOUNDARIES, THE PALESTINIAN
QUESTION AND JERUSALEM. THE US HAD NOT SOUGHT TO
INTERPRET RESOLUTION 242-- WITHOUT
DETRIMENT TO ITS ROLE AS MEDIATOR--
BUT THIS ISSUE COULD NOT BE AVOIDED THOUGH IT WOULD
CLEARLY BE PREFERABLE TO FACE IT AT A LATER STAGE.
THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN PROBLEM WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT
THAN USUAL BECAUSE OF THE SLENDER MAJORITY
OF TWO IN THE CURRENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THAT PROBLEM
WOULD COME DOWN TO ISRAEL HAVING TO DEAL WITH JORDAN
OR TO FACE THE ORGANIZED STRENGTH OF THE ARABS IN SUPPORT OF
THE PALESTINIANS. IN VIEW OF THESE DIFFICULTIES THE US DID NOT
BELIEVE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE COULD BE REOPENED BEFORE EARLY
SEPTEMBER.
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5. TO THE SOVIET UNION RECENT EVENTS MUST HAVE BEEN
PROFOUNDLY UNSETTLING. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST HAD DRAMATICALLY DECLINED. THE SECRETARY
NOTED THAT WHEN HE SAW GROMYKO ON HIS LAST DAY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST IT APPEARED CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS HAD
NOT GIVEN HIM MUCH, IF ANY, INFORMATION. TO THE CREDIT
OF THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, IT COULD BE SAID THAT

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THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY
THEIR EFFORTS AT STRENGTHENING THE SOVIET-US
RELATIONSHIP, AND THAT THEY HAD NOT ACTUALLY
THWARTED PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. IN
TURN IT WAS NOT US POLICY TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET
UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR TO PUSH THE SOVIET UNION
OUT. THE US WOULD NOT RESIST A REASONABLE SOVIET
DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

6.TURNING TO US BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS,
THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT OIL WAS THE LEAST OF OUR
CONSIDERATIONS. THE US SOUGHT TO CREATE A
NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS WHICH WOULD MAKE
IT DIFFICULT FOR THE ARABS TO CONFRONT THE WEST.
US OBJECTIONS TO EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH LIMITING EUROPEAN CONTACTS
IN THE AREA BUT DERIVED FROM A CONCERN THAT THEY
MIGHT GIVE DISPROPORTIONATE WEIGHT TO RADICAL
ARAB ELEMENTS, LEADING TO PRESSURES ON
EUROPE AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE SECRETARY
STRESSED THAT IT WAS IN THE US INTEREST TO HAVE
OTHER COUNTRIES PRESENT IN THE AREA AND UNDERLINED
HOW DESIRABLE HE FELT IT WAS THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO
THE US NOT BE THE SOVIET UNION.

7. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT, IN THE SPIRIT OF
ARTICLE 11 OF THE DECLARATION WHICH HAD JUST BEEN
APPROVED, THE US WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS STRATEGY
AND TACTICS IN THE COUNCIL WITH THE ALLIES IN AN
AREA WHICH WAS SO SENSITIVE AND THE DANGER SO
GREAT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HARMONIZE PRUPOSES. THE
MIDDLE EAST FACED THE BEST OPPORTUNITY IN 25 YEARS FOR
PEACE AND STABILITY AND THE WEST FACED THE BEST
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PROSPECT IN 15 YEARS OF RESTORING ITS INFLUENCE
IN THE AREA BY CREATING A NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS.

8. REFERRING TO OFFICIAL FRENCH STATEMENT ON ME, SAUVAGNARGUES
(FRANCE) VOICED FRENCH ADMIRATION FOR SECRETARY'S
SUCCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EXPRESSED
THE HOPE THAT OUT OF THIS FIRST STEP A DIALOGUE
WOULD EMERGE LEADING TOWARDS A PROCESS OF
NORMALIZATION. ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED
BY THE SECRETARY ABOUT EUROPEAN DIALOGUE WITH THE
ARABS HE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THIS WOULD BE BASED ONLY
ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, NOTING THAT THE WEST
EUROPEANS HAD A LONG HISTORY OF FRIENDSHIP AND INTEREST
IN THE AREA AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT.
EUROPE, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN FAR MORE AFFECTED THAN THE

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US BY THE ENERGY CRISIS. HENCE IT HAD AN ESSENTIAL
INTEREST IN STARTING UP A PROCESS WITH THE ARABS
EVEN THOUGH ONE COULD NOT NOW SEE WHAT PROCEDURES MIGHT
BE USED OR WHAT THE END RESULTS WOULD NECESSARILY BE.
THE EUROPEANS SHOULD HAVE IDEAS
AND SO SHOULD THE ARABS. SHOULD THE ARABS RAISE
POLITICAL MATTERS, THEY COULD BE TOLD THAT THE
EUROPEANS DID NOT WANT TO TALK POLITICS.
WESTERN EUROPE HAD NO INTENTION OF HINDERING
US EFFORTS, BUT THE TRADITIONAL ROLE --ESPECIALLY
OF THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMANS-- WAS SOMETHING THEY
DID NOT WISH TO GIVE UP.

NOTE BY OC/T: OTTAWA 1929 NOT PASSED ALL NATO CAPS.

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NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAJ-01

ACDA-19 IO-14 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-04 SCCT-02

/141 W
---------- 079636
O 191401Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3776
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 OTTAWA 1929

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9. MORO (ITALY), EXPRESSING THANKS TO THE
SECRETARY, SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT THE US
HAD REGAINED THE INITIATIVE AND ACHIEVED A POSITION
OF BALANCE. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD STRONGLY
SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF THE US SECRETARY OF
STATE TO ACHIEVE THIS POLITICAL RECOVERY.

10. DIFFICULT ISSUES WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE
TO ARISE, SUCH AS THAT OF PALESTINIAN
RIGHTS AND OF JERUSALEM. WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD
SUPPORT POLITICAL INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THIS MEANT THERE SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN PRESENCE
IN THE AREA. MORO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE
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SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT EUROPE COULD PERFORM A
USEFUL FUNCTION. THIS EFFORT WOULD FOCUS ESSENTIALLY
ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS, AND A EUROPEAN-ARAB
DIALOGUE, IF CARRIED OUT PRUDENTLY, COULD BE USEFUL
IF THIS TOOK PLACE IN A SPIRIT IN THE ALLIANCE OF
MUTUAL TRUST AND OF CONSULTATION.

11. MORO EXPRESSED ITALIAN AGREEMENT WITH THE
TEXT OF THE NATO DECLARATION.

12. GENSCHER (FRG) THOUGHT A EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE NECESSARY
AND SAID IT WAS VITAL THAT EUROPE SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO
THE ARAB WORLD. THIS DAILOGUE COULD LEAD TO A
CONSULTATIVE PHASE WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY EXCLUDE
EXTREME ARAB ELEMENTS. GENSCHER STIPULATED TWO
PROVISIONS: FIRST, CONSULTATION WITH THE ARABS
DID NOT EXCLUDE CONTACT WITH ISRAEL AND HE SAID
HE INTENDED TO CONTINUE SHORTLY THE DISCUSSION HE HAD BEGUN
IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE EC COUNCIL
WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN BONN. SECOND, THIS CONTACT
WITH THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT BE CONCEALED FROM THE ARABS.
GENSCHER OBSERVED THAT IN DEALING WITH THE ARABS
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANY
MATTERS BEARING ON THE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST.

13. CALLAGHAN (U) COMPLIMENTED THE SECRETARY
FOR DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM IN STAGES
AND THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN RIGHT FOR HIM NOT TO
PROPOUND SOLUTIONS BUT TO CONFINE HIS EFFORTS TO MEDIATION
ONLY. ONE DISADVANTAGE WAS THAT THE PARTIES HAD
NOT BEEN BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. AT SOME STAGE THE
PARTIES CLEARLY HAD TO GET TOGETHER TO TALK DIRECTLY, THOUGH
THE TIME WAS PROBABLY NOT RIPE YET. BOTH SIDES TO

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THE CONFLICT WERE NOW MORE REALISTIC, THOUGH HE WAS
NOT SURE PALESTINIANS WERE YET REALISTIC ENOUGH.

14. FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT, CALLAGHAN NOTED,
ALL STAGES WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE LINKED.
HIS ADVICE TO THE SECRETARY WOULD BE TO CONTINUE HIS MEDIATING
ROLE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. IN THIS CONNECTION,
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TIME WAS NOT ON OUR SIDE.

15. CALLGHAN NOTED THAT THE US HAD TAKEN
POSITIONS WITHOUT NECESSARILY AGREEING WITH
ARAB OR ISRAELI POSITIONS AND INTERPETATIONS,
COMMENTING THAT IT WAS PERHAPS EASIER FOR
THE US TO DO SO THAN FOR OTHERS. INTERPRETATION,
HE THOUGHT, WOULD LEAD TO STERILITY. THE ISSUE
INSTEAD WAS TO TRY TO PERSUADE PARTIES TO MOVE
FORWARD AND NOT TO ASK WHERE EVERYONE STOOD IN
INTERPRETING VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS. THE
PALESTINIANS UNDOUBTEDLY RECOGNIZED THEIR CASE
WAS NOW BETTER UNDERSTOOD; AT THE SAME TIME IT
WAS CLEAR ISRAEL COULD NOT STAND DEFEAT. IT
WAS TIME TO CREATE REALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
NOW.

16. WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE,
CALLAGHAN COMMENTED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT
WISH TO PUSH FOR A ROLE IN REACHING A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT BUT SHOULD MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE.
THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE, HE SAID, SHOULD FOCUS
ON THE ISSUE OF ADJUSTING THE REALITIES OF ARAB
MONEY, WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEEDS OF THE
LDC'S.

17. CALLAGHAN SAID HE LOOKED FOR THE US TO
SHARE THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE PEACE TALKS WITH ITS
ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD BE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY
TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE US WAS FULLY
INFORMED ON WHAT THE EUROPEANS WERE DOING.

18. GUNES (TURKEY), AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION
TO THE SECRETARY FOR HIS EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, NOTED A MAJOR CHANGE IN RELATIONS WITH ARABS.
HE WAS DELIGHTED THAT THE US AND THE EUROPEANS WERE
MEETING A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE
ARABS WHO, FOR THEIR PART, SEEMED TO HAVE GAINED
THE FEELING THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER ALONE AND EVEN
COMMANDED SOME WESTERN SYMPATHY FOR THEIR CAUSE.

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19. GUNES WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE COMPLETELY POLITICAL FROM ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN ANY EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION AMONG NATO ALLIES. HE REFERRED TO PAST TURKISH CONNECTIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD FORMERLY BELONGED TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

20. SHARP (CANADA), AGREEING WITH THE SECRETARY, NOTED CANADA HAD ALSO CONSISTENTLY RESISTED EFFORTS TO INTERPRET SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. REFERRING TO UNEF, HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION OF A THOUSAND MEN TO THE UN FORCES ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. CANADA HAD TAKEN ON THIS OBLIGATION NOT AS A REPRE-SENTATIVE OF NATO--A SOVIET INTERPRETATION WHICH IT RESISTED--BUT AS A MEMBER OF THE UN WHICH UNDERSTOOD THE PRINCIPLES OF GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION. FOR THAT REASON CANADA HAD BEEN WILLING TO SERVE WITH POLAND. SHARP NOTED THAT THE THOUSAND MEN EFFORT,WHILE SEEMINGLY MODEST, WAS NOT AN EASY ONE FOR A SMALL COUNTRY TO MAKE. HE NOTED IN PASSING THE POSSIBILITY OF FRICTION ARISING OUT OF THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PLAND AND ISRAEL.

21. DEPARTMENT REPEAT NEA POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.
KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: OTTAWA 1929 NOT PASSED ALL NATO CAPS.

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